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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SHEILA REESE, REPLY BRIEF 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
-vs- Case No. 960749CA 
Priority No. 14B 
THOMAS E. REESE, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT (hereinafter "plaintiff or "wife") submits the following as 
her reply brief in the above matter: 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. This Court should reverse the ruling regarding the amount and duration of 
child support. Specifically: 
a. This Court should find that the trial court abused its discretion in 
imputing income to the wife, when she had no prior history of working full-time 
and when there was no evidence of full-time employment available to her, nor of 
what her hourly wage would be if she were to work full-time. This Court should 
either base child support upon plaintiff's actual earned income from employment 
of $586 00 per month, and her net rental income of $776 00 per month, for a 
total monthly income of $1,362 00, or 
b This Court should order that only minimum wage may be imputed 
to plaintiff (of about $732 00 per month at the time of trial), and her net rental 
income, to arrive at a gross monthly income for purposes of calculating child 
support of $1,507 00, and 
c This Court should mandate entry of an order that plaintiff be 
awarded one-half her reasonable and necessary work-related day care 
expenses incurred for the child, as additional support, and 
d This Court should order that child support commence effective with 
the date of separation of the parties, which occurred about April 1, 1992, some 
four years prior to the date of trial (Of course, defendant should oe awarded 
credit for any child support he actually paid to plaintiff during the pendency of 
the action), and 
e An order to withhold and deliver should issue from the trial court to 
guarantee payment of defendant's child support obligation 
2 This Court should reverse and remand to the trial court for entry of an 
award of alimony to plaintiff in the sum of $800 00 per month This should be based 
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upon the defendant's income, which was found by the trial court to be $3,592.00 per 
month, against expenses of $2,209.00 per month, and should be based upon the 
plaintiff's income of $1,362.00 per month, or her imputed income, based upon minimum 
wage, of $1,507.00 per month, and her expenses of $1,436.00 per month, plus $388.00 
for health insurance, $205.00 for the mortgage necessary to pay defendant, and 
reasonable sums necessary to enable her to obtain a new car, and afford 
extracurricular activities for this child. This alimony award would equalize the incomes 
and circumstances of the party's households. 
3. This Court should award plaintiff all interest in the Herbert Avenue 
property, free and clear of any interest of the defendant, as plaintiff's sole and separate 
non-marital property, acquired by an advance on her inheritance. This Court should 
specifically find that it was an abuse of discretion to determine that the defendant had 
participated in enhancing or preserving the value of the Herbert Avenue property such 
that he had obtained an equitable interest in the property. This Court should further 
find that the terms and conditions of the "agreement" of the parties pertaining to Herbert 
Avenue are void and unenforceable as a violation of the probate code, as against 
public policy, and/or by reason of a failure of consideration. 
4. This Court should award plaintiff her reasonable attorney's fees incurred 
at trial, based upon the income disparity of the parties, and this Court should also 
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award plaintiff her court costs and attorney's fees incurred on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN COMPUTING 
THE AMOUNT AND DURATION OF CHILD 
SUPPORT. 
This court below erred in its calculation of the amount of child support, and in the 
duration of that child support. Specifically, the court erred in making these calculations 
by imputing income to plaintiff, and/or by failing to impute income to defendant. The 
court further erred by failing to award plaintiff day care for the minor child as additional 
child support, and by failing to enter an order to withhold and deliver. The trial court 
also erred in failing to commence child support effective with the date of the parties' 
separation, on or about April 1, 1992. (The date of separation is established in R.O.A., 
207.) 
A. The District Court Improperly Imputed Income to 
Plaintiff. 
As noted in plaintiff's opening brief, Utah Code Ann.. §78-45-7.5(7)(b), provides 
that a district court may impute income in calculating child support based upon a 
finding of voluntary underemployment, but that such imputation of income must be 
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"based upon employment potential and probable earnings as derived from work history, 
occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons of similar background in 
the community." The defendant, though he argued at trial to impute income to the 
plaintiff, utterly failed to produce any evidence at trial regarding a full-time work history 
for the plaintiff (because there was none), regarding the plaintiff's qualifications to 
obtain full-time employment, or to receive income in excess of minimum wage, and he 
utterly failed to provide evidence of income for persons of similar background in the 
community working full-time. 
Defendant argues in his brief to this Court that plaintiff "clearly acknowledged" 
at trial that she was voluntarily underemployed, and that there is no better indication of 
plaintiff's employment potential and probable earnings than her part-time salary. 
The defendant's reliance upon the holding in Hall v. HallT 858 P.2d 1018 (Ut. 
App., 1993), is misplaced. The Hall decision deals with the question of a drop in 
earnings, upon which a child support award is proposed to be based. It does not deal 
with the plaintiff's circumstances here. The plaintiff has suffered no "drop" in her 
income. As clearly acknowledged by her former husband in his own testimony at trial, 
he had never worked outside the parties' home on a full-time basis during the marriage, 
because she had remained at home and been primarily a homemaker and a mother. 
(R.O.A. 34, Tr. 117). By defendant's own admission, plaintiff's income had actually 
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increased since the separation, if it had moved at all, because plaintiff did not have any 
full-time work history. Thus, her employment at trial was not "underemployment" based 
upon her history. Rather, it demonstrated an effort on her part to juggle the needs of 
the parties' child for supervision, with the child's needs for economic support. 
Defendant's claim that the plaintiff's part-time employment history demonstrates 
that she can obtain full-time employment at $8.00 per hour is disingenuous. There is a 
vast difference between hiring somebody on a part-time basis, to work for a few hours, 
without guarantee of full-time hours and without benefits. It is absolutely logical to 
assume that, whereas an employee might be able to obtain a few hours at a higher 
wage, she would not be considered such a valuable employee if she were taken on a 
full-time basis, and paid a full-time salary plus benefits. The trial court's arbitrary 
decision that plaintiff could obtain an $8.00 per hour job, simply because she had a few 
hours per week at $8.00 per hour, is unsupported by any evidence. The defendant's 
similar assumption in his brief is also unsupported by any evidence. Wife's work 
history is part-time only. Her qualifications are a high school diploma and part-time 
experience. There was no evidence at all of what persons of similar background are 
paid for full-time work in this community. 
By statute, the trial court should, at most, have imputed the federal minimum 
wage to plaintiff, pursuant to Utah Code Ann., §78-45-7.5(7)(c). As correctly noted by 
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defendant in his brief, this imputation must be made if there is "no recent work history" 
and no evidentiary basis for imputing a higher wage. As has already been established, 
there is no evidentiary basis for imputing any particular wage whatsoever for full-time 
employment. Moreover, the defendant urges too restrictive an interpretation of §78-45-
7.5(7)(c). The imputation of minimum wage should apply whenever there is no recent 
work history of the kind sought to be imputed by the trial court. In this particular case, 
the plaintiff has no recent work history for full-time employment, and indeed, during 
almost twelve years of her history which are in evidence, she had never worked full-
time. Because there was no history of what she could earn full-time (if she could even 
obtain full-time employment at all), the court below should have imputed minimum 
wage. 
Plaintiff also falls within two exceptions to the imputation of income, namely the 
costs of child case exception and the unusual emotional needs of the child exception, 
as provided in Utah Code Ann.T §78-45-7.5(7)(d). Defendant improperly argues in his 
brief that this Court must find the costs of child care actually exceed the amount plaintiff 
would earn if she "cured her underemployment." This is not what the statute requires. 
The statute requires merely that the costs of after-school care for this child would 
"approach" the income to be earned by any additional employment. It is undisputed, 
based upon the record at trial, that, if plaintiff were employed full-time, she would have 
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to have after-school care for the parties' daughter. (R.O.A. 195). Defendant suggests 
in his brief that, because the parties' daughter was "nearly ten-years-old" at the time of 
trial, she could do without after-school supervision. Plaintiff submits to this Court that, 
if plaintiff were to leave a nine-year-old child unsupervised routinely after school, for 
hours at a time, she would be guilty of abuse and neglect of that child, the defendant's 
cavalier attitude about the child's need for supervision not withstanding. 
On the basis of this record, adequate evidence exists that the costs of day care for 
the child approach any additional net income the plaintiff might receive by reason of full-
time employment. 
Plaintiffs child also has special emotional needs. The defendant stipulated that he 
would have supervised visitation with the parties' child. He also testified at trial that he 
had settled a sexual misconduct lawsuit with a third-party plaintiff involving his sexual 
misbehavior in the past. It ought to be abundantly clear that defendant would not have 
stipulated to this restriction on his visitation with his child, absent some specific reason he 
would constitute a danger to his own child if he were left alone with her. This fact alone, 
and the fact that the plaintiff cannot rely upon the defendant to give her a break from child-
rearing obligations (as most custodial parents are able to do) indicates that this child has 
special needs and the family has special circumstances which mandate that the mother 
not be required to work full-time. Rather, she should be permitted to be home after school 
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with the child, and to supervise the child, as she has done for the first nine or ten years of 
the child's life. 
B. If Income Is Imputed To Plaintiff, It Should Also Be 
Imputed To Defendant Upon The Same Formula. 
Defendant argues in his brief that it is entirely appropriate that the Court assume 
plaintiff is capable of working 40 hours per week, 12 months per year, at $8.00 per hour, 
if she has been able to find any part-time employment at that pay rate. 
If these kinds of assumptions are appropriate about plaintiff's income, then they 
should be made about the defendant's income as well. Defendant works full-time, about 
40 hours per week, during about nine or ten months of the year. He is paid monthly 
throughout the year for his work, but he has over two months off from mid-June through 
late August when he need not report for work with the school district. During this time, 
defendant could obtain temporary work of some nature. It is just as logical to assume he 
could find a temporary job for two or two and one-half months of the year at his current 
salary, as it is to assume that the plaintiff can obtain full-time employment for the same 
$8.00 per hour the school district is willing to pay her for part-time employment. If the trial 
court reached one conclusion, this Court should, in fairness and equity, reach the other. 
Defendant's income should be deemed increased by at least one-sixth, and this increased 
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income should be used to calculate his child support and alimony obligations. 
Defendant's explanation for why he should not be required to be employed from 
June through August of each year is that, while he is not working as a school teacher, he 
maintains his "rental property." It is critical to note that the defendant's only rental property 
is Belair Drive which he owns jointly in connection with a third party. This third party, who 
also owns one-half interest in this property, clearly has an equal obligation with defendant 
to repair and maintain this property. It begs credulity to suggest that it requires one man's 
full-time labor for five months of the year to perform necessary routine maintenance of a 
single residential building containing three residential units. Yet, this is the impact of what 
defendant claims. Essentially, defendant is saying that he needs two and one-half months 
off each year to do his one-half the repair work. What he really is asking is to take the 
summer each year to work on odd jobs around his house, which the majority of the 
employed population manage to get don on weekends and week nights, while also 
maintaining full-time employment. 
It is also critical to note that, if defendant needs over two months per year, full-time, 
to maintain his rental property/residence, the defendant is entitled to the same 
consideration in assessing her income. Plaintiff, also, is a landlord of rental property. 
Plaintiff has her own residence to care for, and a free-standing rental duplex on Scott 
Circle. The trial court felt free to assume that plaintiff could do everything necessary to 
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manage and maintain her rental property at Scott Circle while working full-time twelve 
months per year. The trial court certainly imputed income to plaintiff on this basis. If 
plaintiff is required to work full-time and to keep up her rental property simultaneously, then 
the same should, in fairness, apply to the defendant 
Defendant cannot simultaneously argue that full-time employment should be 
imputed to plaintiff on the one hand, and argue that he should not also be required to work 
during summers. 
C. The Trial Court Erred In Failing To Commence Child 
Support Effective April 1, 1992. 
As set forth in plaintiff's opening brief, the child of these parties was entitled to 
support from both parents, as a matter of law, during her entire life. It is undisputed these 
parties separated immediately prior to April 1, 1992, and the child has lived with her 
mother, during all of the time since the separation. 
Retroactive support is necessary to make up for child support shortages which 
occurred during the parties' separation. Defendant asserts that there is no evidence of 
any such "shortage." If, in fact, the defendant actually paid plaintiff during the separation 
what he ultimately is ordered to pay by this Court, then he will have no need to fear such 
an order, because he has already paid his obligation. Since he resists so strenuously the 
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retroactive application of child support, it is obvious that he did not make payments in an 
amount mandated by law. 
In his is brief, the defendant objects to an award of retroactive child support 
because it is "not provided for by the Utah Code." (Defendant's brief at page 17). 
First, it should be noted that retroactive child support is not expressly prohibited by the 
Utah CodeT either. Further, everything from the Utah State Legislature set forth in the 
Utah Code provides that minor children are entitled to child support for all of their lives, 
while they are minors, and not just for some of that time. 
Most importantly, the Utah Code does provide for retroactive child support at 
Utah Code Ann.. §78-45a-3, which allows child support to be awarded retroactively for 
a period of four years next preceding the commencement of an action for support. This 
specific section of the Utah Code does not limit its applicability to one kind of child 
support action or another, though that entire section of the Code is the Uniform Act on 
Paternity. 
As noted in plaintiff's opening brief, to award retroactive support to an 
illegitimate child, while depriving legitimate children of the same rights, would constitute 
a gross violation of a child's right to equal protection, as guaranteed by both the State 
and Federal Constitutions. Moreover, this equal protection issue would have to be 
reviewed with great scrutiny, because the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child may be 
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considered a suspect classification. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973). Defendant 
utterly fails to address this entire equal protection concern which arises if Utah Code 
Ann., §78-45a-3, is found not to apply to benefit legitimate children. 
Finally, defendant's argument that plaintiff did not suffer support "shortages" is 
disingenuous. By his own testimony, he paid plaintiff a mere $100.00 per month during 
the first year of their separation, and $150.00 per month less the telephone bill (for a 
grand total of $150.00 per month) during the next three years of the separation. (See 
defendant's brief at page 18.) Since, even failing to impute full-time income to 
defendant, and imputing full-time income to plaintiff, the defendant's child support 
award was more than double $150.00 per month, it is clear that the child has suffered a 
tremendous shortfall in her support. She is entitled to recover this shortfall. 
Defendant makes much of the fact that, over this four-year period, defendant 
was able to make ends meet, and to "save money." First it should be noted that the 
money was saved solely to replace plaintiff's 1965 car with a 1986 car for $2,400.00, 
and to pay the property taxes on plaintiff's two parcels of real property. (Tr. pp. 31, 
27.38 and 39). She had, as of trial, been unable to save any more than those amounts. 
It would be grossly unfair to the child to penalize her, just because her mother 
happened to be frugal, and to make ends meet under difficult circumstances. 
Further, support is never intended to keep children at a mere subsistence level. 
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It is intended to keep children, as much as possible, at the same standard of living they 
would have enjoyed, had their parents never divorced. 
Finally, defendant's own brief acknowledges that the trial court had discretion, at 
least, to award support retroactive to April 1, 1992, if the judge chose to do so. 
However, there are absolutely no findings in the record to demonstrate how the court 
below decided to exercise this discretion, in failing to award any back support to a 
nine-year-old girl who had received inadequate support for four years. At the very 
least, the trial court was obligated to make such specific findings about how it was 
exercising its discretion. It does not suffice merely to say that the plaintiff may have 
had other options to collect this child support, and that, therefore, she is precluded from 
doing so in the final decree of divorce. The trial court should be compelled to make 
specific findings regarding the support, including the financial circumstances of the 
parties and the needs and interests of the child. 
D. The Trial Court Erred In Failing To Award Plaintiff 
Her Day Care Expenses And An Order To 
Withhold And Deliver. 
It is absolutely undisputed that Utah law mandates a custodial parent be 
awarded one-half her work-related day care expenses as additional child support. Utah 
Code Ann.T §78-45-7.16. The failure of the trial court to give this to plaintiff was error 
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by any standard of review. 
The plaintiff was also entitled to receive an order to withhold and deliver, which 
is required under Utah law. Utah Code Ann., §30-3-5.1. The trial court failed to do so, 
based upon defendant's timely payment of child support. The court found that the 
defendant had been "timely" paying child support when he had been paying a mere 
$150.00 per month against a $372.00 real monthly support obligation. Since this 
"timely" payment of support was the lower court's only basis for failing to grant plaintiff 
an order to withhold support, it was error, by any standard of review, for the court to fail 
to do so. 
It does not cure this last defect in the order to suggest that, if defendant were 
ever to fall behind in his ongoing support, the district court could provide an order for 
automatic withholding at that time. Such a remedy would put plaintiff to the expense of 
further litigation, an expense which she should not be required to bear. 
POINT 2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
AWARD PLAINTIFF ALIMONY. 
As noted in the argument pertaining to child support, the plaintiff's earned 
income is, in reality, $586.00 per month. If the Court imputes income, it should be 
imputed at minimum wage of $730.00 per month. In addition, she has net rental 
15 
income of $776.00 per month. 
Also, as noted in the opening brief, defendant was found to have earned income 
of $3,409.00 per month, plus rental income of $183.00. This income should be 
increased by an imputed one-sixth of his earned income, or $568.28. because he is 
capable of obtaining employment during at least two summer months. 
Defendant's expenses were found by the trial court to be $2,209.00, per month. 
(Finding of Fact, number 6). Plaintiff's expenses were found to be $1,436.00 per 
month. (Findings of Fact, number 6). This figure failed to take into account her need to 
purchase her own health insurance, her need to replace an eleven-year-old vehicle, 
her need to devise some means to pay defendant his lien for the Herbert Avenue 
property, and a reasonable request on her part that she have money in her budget to 
pay for extracurricular activities of the parties' child. 
When all of these factors constituting the financial conditions and needs of the 
plaintiff, the plaintiff's ability to produce income for herself, and the defendant's ability 
to provide support, it is clear the court below abused its discretion in failing to give 
plaintiff alimony. Plaintiff is left without money to meet her necessary expenses, while 
defendant enjoys a windfall every month of disposable cash which is not allocated for 
any necessity in his budget. 
Defendant argues that plaintiff has mischaracterized this marriage as a "lengthy" 
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one of over eleven years. In fact, the parties were married for over eleven years from 
the date of their marriage to the date of the divorce trial. If defendant wished to change 
this circumstance earlier, he was free to file a complaint for divorce. This Court has 
previously held a five-year marriage to be so long-term as to require permanent 
alimony. Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1 (Ut. App., 1992). 
In his brief, defendant mischaracterizes the facts by claiming that the plaintiff 
had "worked during the entire course of the parties' marriage." (See defendant's brief 
at page 20.) In fact, defendant himself testified at trial that the plaintiff had been 
primarily a homemaker and a mother during the entire marriage. 
Defendant mischaracterizes the fact that plaintiff was able to remodel the duplex 
on Scott Circle and acquire the interest in Herbert Avenue, free and clear of any 
mortgage. In fact, the remodeling of the Scott Circle duplex was accomplished by a 
loan against the property, paid for by the rental income. The Herbert was an advance 
on plaintiff's inheritance. She did not "earn" either of these assets. They were handed 
to her as a gift, or by the fortunate circumstance of rising real estate values and rising 
rents in the Wasatch Front area during the relevant time period. 
Defendant mischaracterizes the facts by alleging that plaintiff has no long-term 
debt. According to the trial court's order, she owes the defendant $26,000.00, and has 
not one dime of cash resources to pay this debt. She must sell the minor child's 
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residence or encumber it, or sell her rental property or encumber it, in order to meet 
this obligation, thus drastically altering the rosy picture of her finances painted by the 
defendant. She has an eleven-year-old car purchased for $2,400.00 in 1994. The car 
cannot last long and must be replaced. Since she has no savings except to pay 
property taxes, a newer car will have to be financed. Most importantly, plaintiff has 
been able to do all this only by taking in a roommate, an indignity a grown woman with 
a child should not be forced to stoop to. (Tr. pp.36 and 37). 
Defendant disputes the claim that plaintiff is uninsurable, and, alleges without 
evidence that plaintiff will easily be able to obtain health insurance if she just gets a 
full-time job. This ignores her previous breast cancer diagnosis and treatment, which is 
well established in the record. It ignores the fact that not all insurance carriers are 
willing to take on a person with a previous cancer diagnosis, and not all insured groups 
avoid a check for pre-existing disqualifying conditions. Her own testimony at trial was 
that she was uninsurable, and could only obtain health insurance through the H.I.P. 
program of the State of Utah, designed to accommodate people who are otherwise 
uninsurable, at a monthly premium of $388.00. (Tr. pp.33-34). 
There was a clear abuse of discretion in the failure to award plaintiff alimony. 
The failure to award her alimony goes against all established principles of law as set 
forth by this Court regarding awards of alimony. (See Watson, supra.). 
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POINT 3. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
AWARDING DEFENDANT AN INTEREST IN THE 
HERBERT AVENUE PROPERTY. 
Defendant argues in his brief that the Herbert Avenue property was granted by 
plaintiff to defendant eight years before trial by the quit-claim deed and the 
"agreement." As plaintiff has argued in her opening brief, the "agreement" of the 
parties is against public policy, is unenforceable, because of a failure of the defendant 
to perform his consideration, and violates the Utah Probate Code. 
Defendant relies upon the quit-claim deed to support his claim for 25% interest 
Herbert Avenue. His analysis would be applicable if this were not an equitable divorce 
proceeding. However, in actions involving divorce, the actual title of the property is not 
the determining factor. 
Defendant mischaracterizes the plaintiff's argument as an attack on the 
sufficiency of the consideration. Plaintiff has not attacked the underlying consideration 
for the agreement, but rather alleges that the defendant failed to perform the 
consideration, thus making the "agreement" unenforceable by him. Within the four 
corners of that "agreement," he promised to paint the house. He failed to do so. Within 
the "agreement," he promised to support the parties' family, including plaintiff's children 
from a prior marriage, so that plaintiff could save her child support. He failed to do so. 
Defendant attempts to address the fact that the child support provision of the 
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"agreement" is void as against public policy, by pointing out that the district court did 
not bother to follow the "agreement" regarding child support in any event, so that this 
void portion of the document does not matter. This analysis is incongruous. Defendant 
is apparently conceding that the child support provisions are against public policy, 
because they violate the Utah uniform child support guidelines. The same is true of 
those provisions purporting to convey property upon death, without complying with the 
Utah Probate Code. Defendant's argument is apparently that the portions which violate 
the Probate Code can be excised, the portions regarding child support can be excised, 
but that the defendant can still enforce the sole remaining provision, which is 
conveyance of a 25% interest in the Herbert Avenue property to him. Where so much 
of the "agreement" is void or unenforceable, the remaining portions should not be 
carried into effect. 
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POINT 4. PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE AWARDED HER COURT 
COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES INCURRED IN 
THIS ACTION. 
Plaintiff should be awarded her court costs and attorney's fees, as testified at 
trial, in the sum of $5,450.00. Further, plaintiff should be awarded her court costs and 
attorney's fees incurred in pursuing this appeal, in an amount to be determined by the 
Court. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's decision should be reversed and the 
case should be remanded to the trial court for entry of a specific order. This Court 
need not remand the matter for new findings, because the Court has adequate 
evidence before it to find that the trial court's order should be reversed and that a 
specific new order should issue. Specifically: 
a. This Court should remand the case for entry of an order awarding 
the plaintiff/custodial parent adequate child support. Her child support should be 
calculated upon the basis of her actual income ($586.00 per month), or imputed 
minimum wage ($730.00 per month), as this Court may deem appropriate, 
together with her net rental income, and on the basis of the defendant's actual 
income of $3,592.00 per month, or upon his imputed income totaling $4,160.28, 
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as this Court may deem proper. Further, this support obligation should 
commence effective with the parties' separation, four years prior to the date of 
trial, or April 1, 1992; and 
b. This Court should award plaintiff a specific sum of alimony of 
$800.00 per month, commencing effective with the date of trial in June 1996, and 
continuing for eleven and one-half years, or until the death of the plaintiff, the 
death of the defendant, or the plaintiff's remarriage or cohabitation, whichever 
should occur first; and 
c. This Court should reverse the ruling regarding Herbert Avenue, 
and should award all interest in the Herbert Avenue property to the plaintiff, free 
and clear of any interest of the defendant, as plaintiff's sole and separate non-
marital property. In the alternative, the sum due and payable by plaintiff to 
defendant should be made non-interest bearing and payable upon standard 
contingencies, namely, the death of the plaintiff, the plaintiff's remarriage or 
cohabitation in the home with a man other than the defendant, plaintiff selling the 
home at her own election, plaintiff ceasing to use the home as her primary place 
of residence and/or the primary place of residence of the minor child, or the 
minor child achieving the age of eighteen years and graduating from high 
school; and 
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d. Plaintiff should be awarded her court costs and attorney's fees 
incurred in trial of $5,450.00, as testified to at trial (R.O.A., 341); and 
e. Plaintiff should be awarded her court costs and attorney's fees 
incurred in this appeal, in an amount to be determined by the Court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 4th day of August, 1997. 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS 
MARY C. CORPORON 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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